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EUGridPMA Technical Documents
- Namespace constraints file format and semantics
  (Adobe PDF)
  (MS Word)
  
  This document describes the format and parsing rules for the namespaces file
  as shipped with the EUGridPMA and IGTF distributions of the accredited
  authorities. It augments the existing signing_policy scheme for relying-party
  defined name constraints on the valid subject identifiers from trusted 
  identity providers.  
   
  This document describes the specific expression of this namespace constraints
  policy as a policy file stored in a file system, and on the processing and
  interpretation semantics of the policy file by compliant software
  implementations.
   
  Related links:
   
  
  
- EACL signing_policy file format
  This document describes the signing_policy file format used by the
  Globus Toolkit "OLD-GAA" API to restrict the subject signing namespace.
   
  Note that due to implementation limitations in all Globus Toolkit
  versions, the EUGridPMA and IGTF only use positive rights EACL rules.
   
  
  
- 
  OID for Proxy Delegation Tracing
  This document defines the OID allocation from the IGTF used for experimental
  proxy certificate delegation tracing. It assigns OID arc
  1.2.840.113612.5.5.1.1.1 for the use of identifying attributes in RFC 3820
  proxy certificates that facilitate the tracing of delegations in a proxy
  certificate chain.
   
  
  
- HASHRAT SHA-1 Hash Function Risk Assessment
  The most-commonly used hash algorithm in IGTF PKI implemention today is 
  SHA-1, which is however increasingly vulnerable to attacks and its 
  continued use may soon start posing a threat to the IGTF PKI. However, 
  moving to a more modern hash like SHA-2 (or soon SHA-3) has operational 
  consequences for the e-Infrastructure relying on the IGTF PKI in that 
  not all software implementations can currently work with SHA-2. In 
  this document we assess the risk to attacks on SHA-1 with respect to 
  the integrity of the trust fabric and the impact of moving to SHA-2 
  at a given point in time on the operational infrastructure 
   
   
  
  
- Registration Practice Statement
  The RPS outlines the procedures that the community members of the Registration Authority follow to comply with the Profile. A Registration Authority (RA) responsible for the verification prior to the issuance of credentials issued under the Policy.
   
   
  
  
 
 
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