





27th EUGridPMA Rome meeting

from **Monday 14 January 2013**
(09:15)
to **Wednesday 16 January 2013**
(17:00)
Europe/Amsterdam
at **CASPUR (GARR)**
chaired
by: **David Groep (Nikhef)**

[Monday 14 January 2013](#) | [Tuesday 15 January 2013](#) | [Wednesday 16 January 2013](#)

Monday 14 January 2013

09:30	Welcome (10') ( Slides )	
	introductions information from our local hosts agenda, minutes of last meeting, selection of note taker	
09:40	Eulogy Milan Sova (15')	
09:55	Round-table update (05')	
10:00	Updates from the APGridPMA (20')	Eric Yen
10:20	IGTF Risk Assessment Teams actions and future (20')	Jens Jensen
10:40	Report-out from the self-audit review (20') ( Slides )	David Groep
11:00	Coffee (30')	
11:30	CA Update I: SlovakGrid (30')	Miroslav Dobrucky
12:00	SHA-2 availability status and issues (1h00')	
13:00	Lunch (1h30')	
14:30	CAOPS/IGTF Joint Sessions: OCSP Profile for CAs (1h00')	David Groep
15:30	Tea (30')	
16:00	CAOPS/IGTF Joint Sessions: OCPS Recommendations for Relying Parties (1h00')	David Groep
17:00	Closing and location dinner (10')	

Tuesday 15 January 2013

09:15	CA update II: MD-Grid (30')	Valentin Pocotilenco
09:45	CA update III: NIIF Hungarnet (30')	Tamas Maray
10:15	Documenting suitability of Kantara/NIST LoA-2 (45')	unknown
	For the Classic and MICS profiles Documenting suitability of Kantara/NIST LoA-2 ("CILogon style") (with govt. involvement where relevant) as meeting Classic and MICS AP guidelines. This is relevant for our Nordic countries.	
11:00	Coffee (30')	
11:30	Private Key Protection Guidelines and Guidance for the operation of key stores (1h30')	Jens Jensen
	"how to manage access to those keys when data may be locked/encrypted with only these keys for access" (from IGTF session on private key protection guidelines) Private Key Protection (Jens Jensen et al).	
13:00	Lunch (1h30')	
14:30	Generalisation of the SLCS profile - "STS" profile (1h00')	<i>lover loa? new audience?</i>
15:30	Tea (30')	
16:00	Presentation of the next 28th meeting in Kyiv (15')	Sergii Stirenko
16:15	Jens' Soap Box (1h00')	Jens Jensen
17:15	Closing and location dinner (10')	

Wednesday 16 January 2013

09:15 CA update IV: NorduGrid CA and transition (30') Anders Waananen

09:45 CA update V: (reserved) (30')

10:15 TechWednesday (45') group discussion

how to build a 'will it work with the IGTF CAs' suite of test certs for software providers to validate against? How to prevent these having to request a cert from each of us?

11:00 Coffee (30')

11:30 TechWednesday (1h00')

Open Forum (e.g. OCSP implementations)

12:30 Lunch (1h30')

14:00 SCI meeting (3h00') David Kelsey

EUGnd P1A 27.

①.

2/AT * communication challenges: Ursula to coordinate. (for CRs).
- we know of no PKI (F20) specific threat groups yet.
Maybe Scott or Derek.

* Which crypto circle's we move in to gain advance warning.

S/A * All esc update on Wednesday.

* Bernd: Reimer to contact to see if they want to update / stay. (ACT)

* Prod: MARGI, BY, TR, (ACT)

* Harvii: sent on Friday. Doc to review, looks good.

* ROSA completed.

* CALG on hot list (ACT)

Round 14 * ETSI audit passed by EFN - (not grid-specific policies, but physical setup is the same). ETSI does the technical bit, CABForum does the policy bit.

[Coffee]

Slovak Grid OA (Miroslav). Full self audit.

* do not change CA / Subject name constantly, mainly for storage ownership.

* Reviewers: Pavel, Emir

SHA2: * since the TRGPTA time line is materially the same as the Lyon test (modulo Sep/Oct 2012) this is OK.

- "must" when sha-1 is broken, really don't.

- end of SHA-1 CRs allowed per Sept. 2014.

* is it allowed to have both a SHA-1 AND -2 for the same key pair?

- remember to revoke both if priv key compromised

- it's confusing for users, so not recommended. (two keys is clearer)

- but does allow graceful fall-back.

- use two different serial numbers.

- may be g

PRACE is testing Unicore. (should be OK)

jGlibus 2 works., gs:SSHTeam tested by LRA.

EGI/ICS for dCache still in progress.

Not supported:

old Allocation taken.

again on dual-issuance:

- may be good for (interim) CA's to have both hooked cuts.
- with different serial numbers!

do ALLOW two cuts for same keypair and different hashes?

IF: serial is different

but should not be a default for confused users. (by CA)

Status: 2048-bit - forced now at Austrian Grid, etc.

- some are not ready! some issues with IE/vB.

SHA-2 : few (MD-Grid, PRCE) not ready.

others can do only either SHA-1 OR SHA2

Server cuts also relevant for PRACE! Needs availability by CA's

move to SHA-2 monitored by EGI ops team from Q2 or so? EGI CSIRT.

IPV6

- most important for CRL retrieval and OCSP

- most sites (also AP) mainly preparing or testing only.

Recommend (again) availability for all by January 2014!

and keep v4!

Status tracked by particle.ca: see link on /review/

27th EUGrid PMA

(3)

Eric Yen - APGrid PMA. / see presentation

sha-2 OK after March 2013.

* March 22nd (Fri) APGrid PMA meeting.

* IHEP email address formally ready, but should still migrate!

con CCSP discussions: see Wiki + notes Sulea & Dusan.

TUES
~~WEDNESDAY~~

Valentin HD-Grid.CA.

upgrade to OpenBSD 5.2 with new OpenSSL for SHA-2.

Reviewers: Cosmin + Miroslav

Tamas NIF.

TCS also available in Hungary, but not eScience (yet), and only for servers.

TCS personal is also expensive.

maybe run CP off a Raspberry Pi? + LOW-IT HSM @ level 3? → not really HSM?

difficult to generate more demand for TCS Personal.

LoA for MICS Kantosa LoA2 is OK. → see text to mailing list / update MICS

new profile @ LoA 1.x : keep unique and persistent, never re-use
"Basic"

unique globally across IGTF

but can be anonymous, and RPs do more authN vetting.

Tue. 27th EUGrid PMA.

(4)

Implementation: must be different trust another
different OID
different AP profile.

Involvement: RPs(!) Dave K, Sules, David G. +
+ Jens, Jim B.

* Survey by OSC on site needs

OSC: 'user name', email (and VO) needed by sites [real name]
Facing possible without VO for some sites.

if different LOP, also other (security) requirements may change.

* trust in CP operations remains important (parent hijacking)
important for Sules & PRACE.

Looking at new AP "Light-weight uniqueness-guaranteed AP with
secure infrastructure".

JUNet has 800 hr problems

Jens: PKPWRQC <see slides>

CA.org can run the key store → see new Wiki text.

approved by EUGrid PMA → move to other PMA's.

STS: dies in with work for FIM4R. Timeline clear in a few

month since there is no prototype yet.

NEXT STEP: setup wiki with STS text. (ACT). People: Dave K, DG, JS, + Romain

make X.509 bits optional, but needed to integrate STS with current S/W.

(2) X.509 to SAML - (a) service per country

(b) IGTF IdP

(3) our RA knowledge moved as IdP producing also SAML.
again either nationally or IGTF wide.

PERSISTENT UNIQUE NAMING IS ESSENTIAL.

27 EUC/IC/PTIA

(5)

FIN/IR next meeting @ PSI in Filingen (CH) in March
go there, and encourage national federation establishment if
you don't have one yet! Link up through REFEDS and
collaborate.

Too many countries still don't have an operating federation.

Kyiv May 13-15 (Mo → Wed):

-> Soapbox >
more focus on outreach/PR/news! → demonstrate use and relevance. (3)

WEDNESDAY

Andrus / NorduGrid:

rekey needed (new 1024). PMP: some interest in shared-certificate model,
but there is no volunteer to run one and
Milan is no longer.

Test suite: - there is also NIST test suite
- publish test suite also including private keys of EEC
- including expired, revoked etc OSCP
- tar-ball generator → unique keys for security.

properties of test suite: - same number of CAs. - subject naming ":"
- similar properties.

M. L. S. T.:

generating CA's is simple and known, EEC's unknown.
* CA's to provide? EEC's including extreme examples (such as "c" in names).

- "make" script for the suite to generate unique keys.
- characteristic examples needed.

actually compromising a cert to revoke it but not use fresh crl in denting, and you compromise your own cert by sending key to Paul :-)

need sending sample of EEC

- ~~number~~
- host
- extreme case (like UTF-8, diacritical errors)

Test needs to be DIFFERENT from real for names. to prevent confusion

(*) and trade mark issues: "DOT 13" all printable characters

Need CA, EEC's + CRL (+OCSP, in real like for original CA, so also RFC5019, and notably openssl ocsp).

- (ACT) * each CA: {
- send (link to!) sample EEC's
 - known trouble EEC's should be included.
 - 'parameter space' of subject naming.

To develop test suite: etholent?

Test suite should include deliberate failures:

- namespace violations
- expired
- revoked
- CRL+OCSP.

Interested CAs looking for disciples: Jens, DawidG, + Paul M.

Open Forum:

online cis project: NATO project resulted in new (PHP) online CP software "phoca".

DogTag, RedHat CM, ESBCA, OpenCA, MyProxifier, phoca, and some training/test CIs that are on-line.

- Why Level 3? HSM, and not L2? Inspired by ESNet.

- advantages: - role vs. personal activation
- tamper-proof vs. eulicent.

but are these relevant if key is always active?

Classic: 3 ; SLCs: 2.

L2 : you can import a privilege but not get it out. But you want import with signing ceremony anyway.

* put entire thing in a safe (e.g. Raspberry Pi + HSM token + USB stick) - Alladin / SPANet

* compare risks to classic offline.

* better for subscribers and operators



if risk comparable, allow L2 } + compensatory controls. (like a safe)
 discuss with T&P & AP. } + operator present on activation. (pin/passphrase)
 propose for IETF I2IL Handls.

Interest by Ursula, Roberto, Dg.

Test suite

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Participants 27th EUGridPMA meeting

Meeting Information	Registration
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	Name	Affiliation	Membership	
√	1 David Groep	Nikhef	DutchGrid and EGI	
√	2 Jens Jensen	STFC	UK e-Science	
√	3 Roberto Cecchini	INFN - GARR	INFN CA	
√	4 Miroslav Dobrucky	Institute of Informatics SAS	SlovakGrid CA	
N	√	5 Jules Wolfrat	SARA	PRACE
√	6 Reimer Karlsen-Masur	DFN-CERT Services GmbH	GridGermany CA	
√	7 David Kelsey	STFC-RAL	WLCG	
√	8 Jean-Francois GUEZOU	RENATER	Grid2FR	
√	9 Valentin Pocotilenco	RENAM	MD-Grid CA	
	10 Vincent Ribaillier	CNRS / IDRIS	PRACE	
	11 Adeel-ur-Rehman Zafar	National Centre for Physics, Islamabad, Pakistan	PK-GRID-CA	
√	12 Ursula Epting	KIT	GridKa-CA	
√	13 Willy Weisz	University of Vienna	AustrianGrid CA	
	14 Romain Wartel	CERN	CERN	
√	15 Emir Imamagic	University Computing Centre (SRCE)	SRCE CA	
√	16 Nuno Dias	LIP	LIPCA	
√	17 Hardi Teder	EENet	BalticGrid CA	
√	18 Eygene Ryabinkin	NRC ""Kurchatov Institute""	RDIG CA	
	19 Christos Kanellopoulos	GRNET	HellasGrid/SEE-GRID CA	
	20 Antonio David Pérez Morales	RedIRIS	pkIRISGrid CA	
√	21 Cosmin Nistor	Romanian Space Agency (ROSA)	RomanianGRID CA	
√	22 Alexandru Bobe	Romanian Space Agency (ROSA)	RomanianGRID CA	
√	23 Anders Wäänänen	University of Copenhagen	NorduGrid	
√	24 Tamas Maray	NIIF/Hungarnet	NIIF CA	
	25 Eric YEN	Academia Sinica Grid Computing Centre	ASGCCA	
√	26 Pawe 	Wolniewicz	PSNC	
N	√	27 Dusan Radovanovic	University of Belgrade	AEGIS CA

Comments to David Groep.

Boulder, CO, US. 9-10 May.

Dusan

