Certificates for
DataGrid Testbed0

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Agenda

• Day 1 – 4th December, 2000, CERN
  – Aims, agenda, intro, etc.
  – Roundtable status reports
  – Authentication vs Authorisation
  – Which CAs?
  – CA Policies
  – Naming
Agenda (2)

- Day 2 – 5th December, 2000, CERN
  - CA Hierarchy
  - Revocation
  - Scope of certificates
  - Other Grid projects
  - Other issues
  - Summary of decisions/proposals
Attendees

- Jean-Luc Archimbaud  CNRS, France
- Roberto Cecchini  INFN, Italy
- Jorge Gomes  LIP, Portugal
- Denise Heagerty  CERN
- Dave Kelsey  RAL, UK
- Daniel Kouril  Cesnet, Czech Rep.
- Andrew Sansum  RAL, UK

Apologies from:
Francesco Prelz and Guiseppe LoBiondo  INFN
Aims of meeting

- Implement CA(s) for Testbed0
  - But also plan for the future
- Keep it simple! (at least for now)
- Report to WP6 meeting – Milan 11 Dec
- Report to ATF?
- Proposal for authorisation?
Summary of roundtable status

- National CAs already in place and ready for TestBed0
  - Czech Republic
  - France
  - Italy
  - Portugal
  - UK
- CERN not yet ready
- Not sure about status of sites not present
Authentication vs Authorisation

- User requirement for easy access to resources while system managers need to control access
- Strong recommendation not to mix these
  - For non-HEP CAs we will not be able to request the addition of HEP-specific attributes
  - Industry trends
    - PMI (privilege management infrastructure)
  - X.509V3 extension fields should only carry authorisation information that is stable and constant over time
  - “Attribute Certificates” – PKIX IETF working group
  - Also CAS from Globus
Authentication vs Authorisation (2)

- Breaks Globus GSI model
- Privacy – public certificate should include minimal information – user may have control over disclosure

- Recommendation to start a task force on Authorisation
  - Users want easy access to resources
  - Initially – grid map-files
  - then LDAP?

- Account creation – requires coordination?
Which CAs?

- Recommendations
  - Each country/site wishing to join Testbed0 must find a CA willing to issue certificates for them with published and accepted procedures
  - By Testbed0 cutoff date, decide list of initial CA’s + a catch-all solution
  - phase out use of CA’s not meeting the minimum standards within 6 months, e.g. existing Globus CA
  - Should be a small group with responsibility for “accepting” new CA’s
Which CAs? (2)

- CAs should be aware that we will review after 6 months
  - At this point new recommendations may be made
- Short lived CAs may be a good choice for getting started
- Recommend a maximum lifetime for personal certificates of 1 year
CA Policies for Testbed0

- CPS (cert practice statement) for CAs
  - Try to agree minimum set for Testbed0 or a mechanism for agreement of procedures
  - Use beyond Testbed0 at decision of each site?
  - Private key must be offline?
  - Physical access to CA – controlled area
  - Off line CA/signing machine?
  - Security of private key – who? How many?
  - Minimum Key lengths?
CA Policies for Testbed0 (2)

- Minimum policy for RA’s
  - Confirmation from trusted person at each site
    - Identity
    - Request was issued by that person
    - What does it assert?
  - Method of confirmation (RA to CA) must be specified
    - Telephone?, digitally signed mail
  - Must be a mechanism for revocation
  - Owning a certificate is not sufficient for creation of accounts
Naming

- To date, different choices have been made
- Longer term, do we want a hierarchical namespace? (o=hep?)
- Coordination with LDAP namespace?
- This needs further study
- How to map single certificate onto multiple accounts?
CA Hierarchy

- Root CA signs lower level CA certificate
  - proposed changes to globus toolkit would allow clients and servers to only trust the root CA
- Pros
  - Formalises the checking of CPS
  - Simpler/scaleable configuration for growing number of CAs (if mods made to globus)
CA Hierarchy (2)

- Cons
  - Have to trust the root CA
  - In conflict with generic use of certificates
    - Suggests a common scope
    - Would need dedicated DataGrid CAs
  - Heavy reliance (unacceptable?) on the private key of the root CA
  - Compromised or disappearing root CA would cause major problems
    - But could move the root CA
- Conclude – not a useful idea
Revocation

- Each CA must maintain a CRL
- each server/client must regularly copy this CRL from each CA and store it in the “trusted certificates” directory (cron job)
- Globus (SSL) checks this local copy
- We need an agreed policy for CA updating its own CRL (e.g. compromised private key)
Scope of certificates

- Each CA can decide the scope of the certificates it issues.
- One reason not to use a hierarchy of CA’s
- Each site is free to choose which CA’s it trusts
Other issues – Security

- Communication between sites for removing users from authorisation scheme – in addition to revocation of certificate
- Should this certificate group continue?
  - With more general mandate than just certificates?
- Gatekeeper proxy certs
  - Limited functionality
  - Globus-rcp needs full function cert (returning job output)
  - Job for general security task force
Summary of Recommendations

- Use existing CAs, not necessarily specific to DataGrid
- Aim to phase out use of Globus CA
- For those orgs with no CA by cut–off date
  - find someone else willing to issue certs
  - We need a catch–all
- We will provide client/server configuration advice
- Q: What is the cutoff date?
- Q: WP6 should advise on “catch–all” CA
Summary of Recommendations (2)

- CA Hierarchy – not useful
- Authorisation in certificate – no!
- Agree minimum standards for CPS
  – Topic for future meeting of this group
- DataGrid should create a Security task force
  – Beyond testbed0 and certificates
- Authorisation needs to be tackled
  – By whom? LDAP + Security + …?